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NOTE
TORTS-NEGLIGENcE-NEw YoRB: DOCT=nE GRANTING CHABiTABLE HOsPITALs ImmuNITY
FROM "MEDICAL" NEGLIGENCE OF EMpLOYEES ABANDONED IN FAVOR OF MORE MODERN
CONCEPT.-An old rule of law that granted New York hospitals- immunity from the

"medical" negligence of its employees has recently been abandoned. In a decision of
major importance, the state's highest tribunal ruled that the ancient theory of nonliability ". . . is out of tune with the life about us, at variance with modern-day needs
and with concepts of justice, and fair dealing. It should be discarded."'
The impact of this decision can best be appreciated by reference to the sources
of the immunity doctrine. Historically, there were four general views as to the
extent of immunity of charitable corporations from tort liability. First, general immunity was granted. This was held in the first English case on the subject, which
reasoned that it would be a breach of the trust to apply the trust funds to damages.
3
This reasoning was later discredited in England and received but slight support in the
4
doctrine of respondeat superior did not
the
that
was
view
second
The
United States.
0
5
apply to charitable corporations. An English decision, later overruled, had suggested
American cases
earlier
enough,
curiously
and,
this view in the case of a public corporation,
applied this reasoning to charitable institutions and ignored the subsequent English rejec7
tion. Some American jurisdictions refused to follow the view rejected by the English
to torts by
courts by adopting a third position, namely, that an immunity should extend
9
s
agents against the beneficiaries of the charity but not against outsiders. Finally, there
10
was a fourth view denying immunity altogether.
These early theories supported the refusal of most American courts to hold a
charity liable for the negligence of its servants. This attitude has been the source of
much judicial conflict and controversy, and many theories and exceptions were advanced to rationalize the old rule. But the basic anomaly that under the charitable
immunity doctrine, the injured party is, in effect, compelled to contribute his injury
the considto the charity, has led to the increasing acceptance of the view that "...
1 Bing v. Thunig, 2 N. Y. 2d 656, 135 N. E. 2d 42 (1956).
2

Heriot's Hospital v. Ross, 12 Cl. & F. 507, 8 Eng. Rep. 1508 (1846).

3 Mersey's Docks, etc. Trustees v. Gibbs, L. R. 1 H. L. 93, 11 Eng. Rep. 1500

(1866).
(1885); Parks v. Northwestern
4 Perry v. House of Refuge, 63 Md. 20, - Ati. University, 218 IE. 381, 75 N. E. 991 (1905); Fire Ins. Patrol v. Boyd, 120 Pa. St.
624, 15 At. 553 (1888).
5 Holliday v. St. Leonard, 11 C. B. n.s. 192, 142 Eng. Rep. 769 (1861).
6 It had been decided chiefly on the trust-fund doctrine and was therefore in effect
reversed by the Mersey Docks case, see note 3 supra. Almost immediately afterwards,
however, the express point again arose and Lord Blackburn held that a public corporation was liable on the theory of respondeat superior. Foreman v. Mayor, etc. of
Canterbury, L. R. 6 Q. B. 214 (1870); accord, Gilbert v. Trinity House, 17 Q. B. D.
795 (1886).
7 Heirns v. Waterbury Hospital, 66 Conn. 98, 33 At. 585 (1895); McDonald v.
Mass. General Hospital, 120 Mass. 432, - N. E. - (1876); Jensen v. Maine Eye and
Ear Infirmary, 107 Me. 408, 78 At. 898 (1910).
8 Powers v. Mass. Homeopathic Hospital, 109 Fed. 294 (1st Cir. 1901).
9 Hordern v. Salvation Army, 199 N. Y. 233, 92 N. E. 626 (1910); Kellog v.
Church Charity Foundation of Long Island, 128 App. Div. 214, 112 N. Y. Supp. 566
(2d Dep't 1908).

V0 Galvin v. Rhode Island Hospital, 12 R. I. 411, -

At. -

(1880).
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erations of public policy against the immunity doctrine far outweigh those in support."l"
Still, the problem remains purely a question of state law. In some states the fact
that a charitable institution carries indemnity insurance does not create liability where
such institutions are themselves immune from liability. Here, the insurance company
is not liable either, although sound principles would indicate that if such is the law,
the insurance is a nullity and the insurer has received a premium but has given nothing
12
In other jurisdictions the insurer is liable only to the extent
of value in return.
13
However, American judicial thinking, which formerly gave
of the insurance coverage.
general acceptance to the immunity rule and its variations, now gives that doctrine
a very modest majority. The tendency has definitely been in recent years to over14
rule the doctrine.
In New York, the famous case of Schloendorff v. New York Hospitallg was the
most important of the earlier decisions. From this case a body of law developed
making the liability of a hospital for injuries suffered by a patient, through the negligence of its employees, depend on whether the injury producing act was "administrative" or "medical." Under this rule the hospital would be liable for the administrative but not for the medical or professional negligence of its employees. The court
assigned two reasons for this conclusion. The first was that one who seeks charity
must be deemed to have waived any right to damages suffered through his benefactor's negligence. But this rule was not limited to charity patients and was expand0
The second
ed to cover both paying patients and private or profit-making hospitals.'
reason which the court advanced was that the doctrine of respondeat superior did not
apply to doctors and nurses as they were to be regarded as independent contractors
rather than employees, due to their special skill and the lack of hospital control exerted over their work.
The medical-administrative distinction has long plagued the New York courts,
and a consistent and clearly defined separation of the terms has proved to be highly
11 President and Director of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F. 2d 810 (D. C.
Cir. 1942); accord, Pierce v. Yakima Val. Memorial Hospital Ass'n., 43 Wash.
2d 162, 260 P. 2d 765 (1953); Foster v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Vermont, 116 Vt.
124, 70 A. 2d 230 (1950).
12 Williams v. Church Home, 223 Ky. 355, 3 S. W. 2d 753 (1928).
13 Gorman v. St. Paul's Fire and Marine Insurance Co., 121 A. 2d 812 (Md. 1956).
14 Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P. 2d 220 (1951); Silva v.
Providence Hosp. of Oakland, 14 Cal. 2d 762, 97 P. 2d 798 (1940); Haynes v. Presbyterian Hasp. Assn., 241 Iowa 1269, 45 N. W. 2d 151 (1950); Noel v. Menninger Foundation, 175 Kan. 751, 267 P. 2d 934 (1954); Mississippi Baptist Hasp. v. Holmes, 214
Miss. 906, 56 So. 2d 709 (1952); Avellone v. St. John Hospital, 165 Ohio St. 467, 135
N. E. 2d 410 (1956); Pierce v. Yakima Val. Memorial Hosp. Ass'n., 43 Wash. 2d
162, 260 P. 2d 765 (1953). It is worthy of note, that there is general agreement
among text writers and other commentators that the rule of immunity should be abandoned and the doctrine of respondeat superior applied. See, 2A Bogart, Trusts and
Trustees § 401 (St. Paul 1953); Prosser, Torts § 109 (2d ed. St. Paul 1955); Bobb6,
Tort Liability of Hospitals in New York, 37 Cornell L. Q. 419 (1952); Feezer, The
Tort Liability of Charities, 77 U. Pa. L. Rev. 191 (1928); 163 Journal Amer. Med.
Ass'n. 285 (1956).
15 211 N. Y. 125, 105 N. E. 92 (1914).
36 Bakel v. University Heights Sanitarium, 320 N. Y. 870, 100 N. E. 2d 51 (1951);
Steinert v. Brunswick Home, 172 Misc. 787, 16 N. Y. S. 2d 83 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Co.
1939), aff'd, 259 App. Div. 1018, - N. Y. S. 2d - (2d Dep't 1940), leave to appeal
denied, 284 N. Y. 822, - N. E. - (1940). See, 3 N. Y. Law Forum 212 (1957), for
comparison of New York Public and Private Hospital tort liability.
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elusive.' 7 From such distinctions, only rough delineations of policy could be determined. The long standing dissatisfaction with the application of this rule finally led
to its ultimate rejection in the instant case. Judge Fuld in his opinion declared that
the court did "not consider it either wise or necessary again to become embroiled in
an overnice disputation" as to whether the negligence in the present case "should be
labeled administrative or medical."
The court stressed that: "The doctrine of respondeat superior is grounded in firm
principles of law and justice. Liability is the rule, immunity the exception. It is not
too much to expect that those who serve and minister to members of the public should
do so, as do all others, subject to that principle and within the obligation not to injure
through carelessness."
"Hospitals should, in short, shoulder the responsibilities borne by everyone else.
The test should be, for these institutions whether charitable or profit-making, as it is
for every other employer, was the person who committed the negligent injuryproducing act one of its employees and, if he was, was he acting within the scope
of his employment."
It should be noted that in a separate opinion, judge Conway concurred in the
result of the case, but indicated his dissatisfaction with pronouncing the ultimate fate
of the Schloendorff rule. "We should . . . not go on to overrule the . . . (old) . . .
doctrine," because, in his opinion, voluntary hospitals are not conducted as a business
and the former doctrine of immunity has permitted the survival of many hospitals,
particularly in smaller communities.
Thus, the basic issue presented in tort cases involving charities appears to be the
problem of where the public interest is best served. The protection of the injured
individual is opposed to the danger that the effectiveness of public benefactors may
be curtailed through oppressive recoveries. But it would seem that a charity's personality will suffer no less detriment if it is allowed to be less responsible than a private
enterprise. If the publis seeks benefit, if men search to benefit the public, justice
demands that due care should be taken not to harm those intersts met in the process.
At the time the immunity rule originated, not only was there the possibility that a substantial award in a single negligence action might destroy a hospital, but concern was
felt that such a recovery might discourage generosity and "constrain . . . (them), as a
measure of self-protection, to limit their activities."18
This factor was considered in the present decision, and the court determined that
today's hospital is different from its predecessors in that it receives wide community
support, employs a large number of people and operates its plant in a business-like
fashion. As a consequence of this, public policy may best be advanced by making
such a hospital liable for its negligence. "Insistence upon respondeat superior and
damages for negligent injury serves a two-fold purpose, for it both assures payment
injured and gives warning that justice and the law deof an obligation to the person
19
care."
of
exercise
mand the
17 Iacono v. New York Polyclinic Med. School & Hosp., 296 N. Y. 502, 63 N. E.
2d 450 (1946); Sutherland v. New York Polyclinic Med. School & Hosp., 298 N. Y.
682, 82 N. E. 2d 583 (1948); Necolayff v. Genesee Hosp., 296 N. Y. 936, 73 N. E. 2d
117 (1947); Berg v. New York Soc. for Relief of Ruptured & Crippled, 1 N. Y. 2d
499, 136 N. E. 2d 523 (1956); Peck v. Charles B. Towns Hosp., 275 App. Div. 302,
89 N. Y. S. 2d 190 (1st Dep't 1949); Bryant v. Presbyterian Hosp. in City of N. Y.,
304 N. Y. 538, 110 N. E. 2d 391 (1953); Ranelli v. Society of N. Y. Hosp., 295 N. Y.
850, 67 N. E. 2d 257 (1946); Grace v. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp., 301 N. Y.
660, 93 N. E. 2d 926 (1950).
18 Scholendorff v. New York Hospital, 211 N. Y. 125, 105 N. E. 92 (1914).
19 See note 1, supra.

